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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code §78B-5-826 
Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, t 2 4 , 100 P.3d 1200 
Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, If 13, 62 P.3d 440 
West v. Case. 2006 UT App 325, 142 P.3d 576 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Appellant presents one issue on appeal: 
Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court correctly denied the Appellant's motion for 
attorney's fees based on Utah Code § 78B-5-826 where the Appellant and Appellee were 
never parties to a contract containing an attorney's fees provision, and the trial court 
dismissed the Plaintiffs case for lack of standing. 1 The determination by the lower court 
not to award attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code §78B-5-826 is one that is made at the 
discretion of the trial court pursuant to the very language of the statute itself. 
Accordingly, this Court is to review the trial court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
l For simplicity UCA§ 78B-5-826 is used throughout this brief when referring to §78-27-
56.5 before it was re-numbered. 
l 
Plaintiff/Appellee Roger Hooban purchased a distributorship via a bankruptcy 
trustee's sale. After purchasing the distributorship, the Defendant/Appellant Unicity 
International refused to allow Plaintiff to continue to operate the distributorship. After 
months of failed negotiations, Hooban sued Unicity in an attempt to compel Unicity to 
recognize him as the owner of the distributorship he bought. After a year and a half of 
litigation, Unicity moved for summary judgment claiming that Hooban had no standing to 
sue because he was not a party to the contract Unicity had with H&H Network Services, 
Inc ("H&H"). The trial court ruled that Mr. Hooban, not being a party to any contract 
with Unicity, had no standing to sue to enforce the H&H contract, and therefore 
dismissed all of his claims. Mr. Hooban sought to join the contracting party to the lawsuit 
as a Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but Judge 
Schofield would not allow H&H, the contracting party, to join as Plaintiff to the lawsuit. 
Unicity, which had successfully persuaded the trial court to conclude that Mr. 
Hooban was not a party to the distributorship agreement, and therefore could not sue 
Unicity for what Unicity had done to the distributorship, then moved for an award of 
attorney's fees based on the very agreement the lower court would not allow Mr. Hooban 
to sue on. The trial court first pointed out that pursuant to the very language of the statute, 
it had discretion whether to award attorney's fees under §78B-5-826, and based on the 
facts before it, the trial court chose not to. The trial court correctly recognized that Utah 
Code §78B-5-826 was intended to apply to contracting parties, and not to any party to 
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litigation. The trial court correctly ruled that because Mr. Hooban was not a party to the 
contract, §78B-5-826 was inapplicable. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about June 7, 2004, John and Brenda Hargett filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington. Record 
(hereinafter "R.") at 13, 143. 
2. The Hargetts listed their Unicity Distributorship (100% of the stock thereof) as an 
asset having no dollar value in the bankruptcy. R. at 139. 
3. Roger Hooban was the highest bidder for the distributorship at a bankruptcy 
auction held by the United States Trustee on November 19, 2004. R. at 131, 133-135. 
4. On November 30, 2004, Mr. Hooban tendered the lump sum of $32,000 to the 
United States Trustee as payment for the distributorship. R. at 41, 131. 
5. Although Unicity was made aware of the bankruptcy sale along with all the other 
creditors (R. at 31-35), and was given the opportunity to make a proof of claim (R. at 
141-45), and had at least one of its other distributors, Rick Jordan present and bidding at 
the auction, Unicity did not bid at the bankruptcy auction (R. at 133-35). 
6. In a letter dated December 7, 2004, Unicity attempted to purchase the 
distributorship back from Mr. Hooban for an unspecified number of payments to total 
$32,000 over time. R. at 24, 37, 124. 
7. Mr. Hooban refused the offer of payments from Unicity, but attempted to reach a 
resolution with Unicity whereby he could operate the distributorship. R. at 1787-88. 
8. After months of negotiation without success (Id.), Mr. Hooban sued Unicity, 
alleging causes of action based in tort, equity and in contract (causes of action were: 
Breach of Contract, Conversion, Unjust Enrichment, Breach of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing, Intentional Interference with Economic Relations, Injunctive Relief and 
Attorney's Fees). R. at 1-16. 
9. Unicity's Policies and Procedures contains an attorney's fees provision that is 
already reciprocal to both contracting parties. It reads: "In the event of a dispute, the 
prevailing party shall be reimbursed attorney's fees...."" R. at 163. A copy of the 
relevant portion of the Unicity Policies and Procedures referenced is attached at 
Addendum 1 for reference. 
10. A year and a half into the lawsuit, both Unicity and Mr. Hooban filed for summary 
judgment. R. at 1132-33, 1215-16. 
11. The trial court granted Unicity's motion for Summary Judgment, finding that H&H 
Network Services was the contracting party that owned the distributorship, not Roger 
Hooban, thus Mr. Hooban had no standing to sue on behalf of the distributorship. R. at 
1584. The trial court found that Mr. Hooban had "purchased stock, not a distributorship 
agreement." Id. A copy is attached hereto as Addendum 2 for reference. 
12. Thereafter Unicity brought a motion for attorney's fees against Mr. Hooban based 
on its contract with H&H Network Services. R. at 1630-31. Mr. Hooban opposed the 
motion (R. at 1778-1808) and oral argument was heard on June 4, 2007 (R. at 1848). 
13. The trial court denied Unicity's motion for attorney's fees in a ruling entered on 
July 19, 2007. Judge Davis ruled: " [Unicity] overlooks the fact that the award of 
attorney's fees in [§78B-5-826], is permissible. The court can take into account the very 
unique circumstances and facts of each case." R. at 1844. A copy is attached hereto as 
Addendum 3 for reference. 
14. Judge Davis further explained: 
The court opines that the intent of the statute is to allow the party in the 
contract in a weaker position to have reciprocal rights to seek attorney's 
fees .... [Unicity] overlooks the fact that the award of attorney's fees in 
[78B-5-826], is permissive.... In order for the provision to apply, inter alia, 
the promissory note, written contract, or other writing must have been 
executed after April 28, 1986.... If the agreement has been completed and 
signed by these parties and Mr. Hooban has immediate rights, then he would 
have standing under the agreement. But he has never executed the 
agreement and cannot be bound by its terms. Judge Schofield found that he 
lacked standing. That is the law of the case and the parties are bound by that 
ruling. 
R. at 1843-1844 (emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Unicity's appeal is based on case law addressing some of the language in Utah 
Code §78B-5-826, but Unicity ignores the plain English meaning of the very language of 
the statute. Controlling Utah case law and the statute itself defeat Nicety's theory. The 
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appeal for attorney's fees under Utah's reciprocal fees statute fails for several reasons, 
each of which alone is sufficient for this Court to affirm the trial court's ruling. First, an 
award under Utah Code §78B-5-826 is discretionary, and based on the circumstances in 
this case the trial court properly exercised its discretion choosing not to award attorney's 
fees to Unicity. Second, Utah law is clear that §78B-5-826 only applies to the parties to 
the contract in question, "and not any party to the litigation." R. at 1845 (quoting Angling 
v. Contractor Fabrication Machining, 2001 UT App 341, ]f 10, 37 P.3d 267. Third, Utah 
Code §78B-5-826 only applies to contracts executed after April 28, 1986, and no contract 
was ever executed between the parties to this appeal. Fourth, it would be grossly 
inequitable to bind Mr. Hooban by the very terms of a contract between Unicity and H&H 
Network Services to which the lower court found Mr. Hooban was not a party and 
therefore had no standing to enforce. Fifth, the Bilanzich case (Bilanzich v. Lunette, 
2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041) is inapplicable because Bilanzich deals with parties to a 
contract that was determined not to be enforceable between the contracting parties, but 
does not address the very issue of this case, which is whether one party can use the 
reciprocal fees statute and its contract with a third party to obtain attorney's fees against 
an individual that had nothing to do with the third-party contract. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Utah Code § 78B-5-826 explicitly authorized the trial court to use its 
discretion to award, or not award attorney's fees to a prevailing party. 
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Unicity ignores the first glaring flaw in its appeal; the very language of Utah Code 
§78B-5-826 gives the trial court discretion whether or not to award fees to a prevailing 
contracting party. Drake v. Industrial Common of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
Nothing short of a showing of an abuse of discretion would be sufficient to justify a 
reversal by this Court because "the language of [§78B-5-826] is not mandatory but allows 
courts to exercise discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs." Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 
2007 UT 26, f 17, 160 P.3d 1041. Ironically, the very case upon which Unicity 
erroneously relies for its appeal affirms the long-standing standard that such an award of 
attorney's fees is discretionary. The trial court noted as much in its Ruling (R. at 1844). 
Unicity now wants this Court to reverse the lower court's decision even without the 
necessary showing of an abuse of discretion in applying the statute. However Unicity has 
not set forth any evidence from the Record to support a contention for abuse of discretion. 
It is noteworthy that the application of the statute to the facts of the case is where the trial 
court has properly exercised its discretion. Unicity has not marshaled any facts to support 
an argument for abuse of discretion. To the contrary, all of the facts cited by Unicity 
show that the lower court exercised its discretion and even explained in its ruling several 
bases why it had done so. 
This Court's review for correctness goes to the interpretation of the language of 
the reciprocal fees statute, which has been interpreted by the trial court consistently with 
its plain and unambiguous meaning in the English language. The word "may" in the 
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English language is a word that is "used to express possibility" or "used to express 
opportunity or permission" (Random House Webster's College Dictionary, p. 838 
(1991)). Thus, where the statute reads, "A court may award costs and attorney's fees....", 
the legislature intended for the trial court to have the ability to choose to award or choose 
not to award attorney's fees based on the facts of the specific case. The trial court's 
decision clearly pointed out that the award under the reciprocal fees statute is permissive 
pursuant to its very language, giving the court the ability to "take into account the very 
unique circumstances and facts of each case." R. at 1844. There was no error in the 
lower court's interpretation of Utah's reciprocal attorney's fees statute. There really is 
not anything further the Court need consider in this matter. Unicity is asking for relief 
that it has not even attempted to support with evidence from the record showing an abuse 
of discretion, and therefore the appeal must fail. 
2. Utah Code §78B-5-826 only applies to the parties to the contract upon which 
an award of attorney's fees could be based, "and not any party to the 
litigation." 
Unicity fails to address another fatal flaw in its appeal. Utah's reciprocal 
attorney's fees statute is inapplicable to this case because the statute is intended to "level 
the playing field" so to speak between contracting parties, and the parties to this lawsuit 
never entered into any contract with each other. The Unicity Policies and Procedures, 
which Unicity claims were by reference incorporated into the H&H/Unicity contract, 
explicitly grants attorney's fees to the prevailing contracting party (H&H or Unicity) 
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should a dispute arise, but Mr. Hooban never was a party to the contract with Unicity. 
There is no need to level the playing field between Mr. Hooban and Unicity because the 
two are not even on the same field. 
If Mr. Hooban was not a party to the agreement, the terms of the agreement, 
including the attorney's fees provision (Addendum 1), cannot apply to him. See Fericks 
v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, ^ 24, 100 P.3d 1200 (stating one of the most basic 
principles of contract law that only the parties to the contract can be bound by the 
contract). Unicity has utterly failed to provide the Court with any reason why the long-
standing precedent stated again in Fericks should be ignored in this appeal. The reality is 
that precedent should not be ignored, and this Court should affirm. 
Utah Courts have refused to award attorney's fees where one party to the action is 
not a party to the contract in question even if the action is based on a written agreement 
with prevailing party language. See Anglin v. Contractor Fabrication Machining, 2001 
UT App 341, 37 P.3d 267; West v. Case, 2006 UT App 325, 142 P.3d 576. In fact, in 
Anglin, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. §[78B-
5-826] only applies to the parties to the contract in question and "not any party to the 
litigation." Anglin, 2001 UT App 341,110, 37 P.3d 267. This Court correctly rejected 
the argument that any party to the litigation may recover fees so long as one party to the 
contract has the right to do so under the contract. Id. at ^ 11-12. In its analysis, this 
Court reasoned: 
Here, the plain language of the statute defeats Custom Steel's position. Custom 
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Steel would have us construe the statute to mean that any party to the litigation 
involving a promissory note may recover attorney fees so long as one party to 
the note has the right to recover attorney fees under the note. To support 
Custom Steel's interpretation, however, the statute would have to read, ,fany 
party that prevails . . . ." The statute states clearly that "either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note" may recover 
attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § [78B-5-826]. The use of the word "either," 
which comes directly before and modifies the word "party," is reasonably 
read to restrict the meaning of "party" to include only the parties to the 
original promissory note, not any party to the litigation. 
Id. at 110. 
Unicity is trying in this case to do what Custom Steel attempted and failed to do in 
Anglin. There is no legal support for such a position. The Utah Court of Appeals 
explained that the intent of the statute is to allow either party to a contract to have a right 
to enforce a provision for attorney's fees even if the provision is written in favor of just 
one of the contracting parties. This logical and equitable approach affords the contracting 
party that is in a weaker position to have reciprocal rights to seek attorney's fees to 
"creat[e] a level playing field for all parties." Id. at | 12. That is why the very title of the 
statute is "Attorney Fees - Reciprocal Rights to Recover Attorney Fees." See Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-5-826. How could a "reciprocal" right apply to a person that is not even a 
party to the provision of a contract that Utah law deems is reciprocal between the 
contracting parties? The very word "reciprocal" is defined as "mutual.. .corresponding; 
matching; equivalent; ...." Random House Webster's College Dictionary, p. 1125 
(1991). Contrastingly, under Unicity's theory, reciprocal would mean "applying to any 
third party" instead of mutual, matching, corresponding or equivalent, all of which 
10 
describe the relationship between contracting parties subject to the reciprocal fees statute. 
Certainly, the statute's intent only permits the recovery of attorneys' fees by one party to 
a contract against another party to the contract, and does not serve as a mechanism for one 
party to use a third party contract to bind any other non-contracting party. 
The reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees is not applicable here simply 
because a contract between one of the parties and a third party (that is not in the lawsuit) 
is the underlying basis for Unicity's claim for fees. In Anglin, this Court explained: 
Such a construction is clear not only from the plain language of the statute, but 
also from the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. "When interpreting a 
statute, it is axiomatic that this courtfs primary goal fis to give effect to the 
legislature's intent in light of the purpose that the statute was meant to 
achieve.1" Biddle, 1999 UT 110 at P14 (quoting Evans v. Utah, 963 P.2d 177, 
184 (Utah 1998)). 'The general rule in Utah is that attorney fees cannot be 
recovered absent statutory authorization or contract.f" Carr v. Enoch Smith 
Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Cooper v. Deseret 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 757 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). 
"Moreover, where a contract provides for attorney fees, they are awardable 
only on the terms and to the extent authorized in the contract." Id. Thus, if a 
contract allows only one party to recover attorney fees—presumably the 
drafting party—the other party to the contract-usually the weaker party-cannot 
recover attorney fees, even if it is the prevailing party in litigation arising 
under the contract. Section [78B-5-826] specifically addresses this situation 
by providing reciprocal rights to attorney fees, thereby creating a level playing 
field for all parties to a promissory note. 
Anglin, 2001 UT App 341,111, 37 P.3d 267. In this case however, Unicity's attorney's 
fees provision in the contract it has with H&H has an attorney's fees provision that by its 
very language is already reciprocal. It reads, "In the event of a dispute, the prevailing 
party shall be reimbursed attorney's fees...."" R. at 163. There is no need or application 
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for the reciprocal fees statute because both parties to the H&H/Unicity contract already 
have the right that the statute would otherwise afford to a party that signed a one-sided 
contract. The reciprocal fees statute cannot simply be implemented as Unicity is 
attempting - in an effort to bind a non-contracting third party. 
Likewise, in West v. Case, 2006 UT App 325, 142 P.3d 576, this Court determined 
that attorney's fees were not properly awarded where the party against whom fees were 
sought was not a party to the contract upon which the action was based. In West, Ms. 
Case was a successor trustee to her mother's trust, which held quitclaim deeds to the 
parcels of property that Case's mother agreed to sell to West under a Uniform Real Estate 
Agreement ("UREA"). West, 2006 UT App. 325, ffl[ 2, 4, 142 P.3d 576. When Case 
refused to transfer the deeds to West, West filed action against her for breach of contract. 
Id. at 1f 6. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of West and awarded 
attorney's fees pursuant to the language of the UREA. Id. However, the Utah Court of 
Appeals correctly reversed the award of attorney's fees based on the undisputed fact that 
Case was not a party to the UREA, or a successor to the UREA, and therefore, not a party 
for purposes of the reciprocal attorneys fees statute. Id. at ^ 23. The court held that 
"although Case had an in rem obligation to transfer the Property to the Wests, we 
determine that neither Case nor the Trust became bound by any other terms of the 
Agreement merely because they took ownership of the Property." Id. at ^ 21. Unicity 
now wants this Court to remand this matter and instructing the trial court to do the very 
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act it determined was reversible error in West. Unicity wants to enforce an attorney's fees 
provision of its contract with H&H against Hooban simply because Hooban purchased the 
stock of H&H. Pursuant to West, the statute cannot be misconstrued to bind Mr. Hooban 
because he was not a party to or successor of any contract with Unicity. 
In the present case, there is simply no contract between the parties and Mr. Hooban 
never signed any document containing an attorneys' fees provision, and is not a successor 
to the H&H/Unicity contract. By finding that Mr. Hooban was not a party/successor to 
the H&H/Unicity contract, the trial court in this matter precluded either party to the 
lawsuit from having any ability under §78B-5-826 to recover attorney's fees against the 
other. 
3. Utah Code §78B-5-826 is only applicable to contracts executed on or after 
April 28,1986, and thus inapplicable to this case because there was no 
contract executed between the parties on or after April 28, 2009. 
The trial court correctly recognized that Unicity overlooked the very language of 
the statute it contended authorized a recovery of attorney's fees. R. at 1843-44 The 
statute clearly states that "A court may award costs and attorney fees ... based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986 " 
§78B-5-826 (emphasis added). Here Mr. Hooban never executed a contract with Unicity, 
thus how could a statute governing contracts between parties contracting on or after April 
28, 1986 even apply? It cannot. Unicity's clever notion that it can recover attorney's fees 
based on a contract coupled with the reciprocal fees statute when it has no contract with 
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Mr. Hooban makes no sense. If Mr. Hooban had contracted with Unicity, then his claims 
would not have been dismissed for lack of standing. Once both parties are established to 
have the ability to enforce a contract, then the attorney's fees provision of the contract, no 
matter how one-sided, becomes reciprocal (if unilateral, which it was not since it applied 
to both parties of the H&H/Unicity contract) and applies to both contracting parties. That 
is the relationship Unicity has with H&H Network Sendees, which Hooban sought to join 
as a plaintiff to the lawsuit (R. at 1267, 1268), but was not allowed to (no ruling by the 
trial court on the request). If H&H was the Plaintiff, Unicity's claim for fees would have 
some merit because it is believed that H&H did execute a contract with Unicity on or 
after April 28, 1986. However, since Roger Hooban did not execute a contract, and is not 
the assignee of a contract with Unicity, Unicity cannot enforce any contractual rights 
against him personally. 
4. Equity and justice support the notion that Mr, Hooban cannot be bound by 
the very terms of an enforceable contract that he has been adjudicated to not 
have been a party to nor have standing to enforce, 
Unicity contends that because Mr. Hooban asked for an award of attorney's fees 
had he prevailed on the merits of his claims, Unicity should be awarded its attorney's fees 
because it substantially prevailed before the trial court by getting Mr. Hooban's claims 
dismissed for lack of standing. Unicity's tenuous position is illogical at best. If Roger 
Hooban had standing to sue to enforce the H&H/Unicity contract, then the parties would 
have moved forward with the lawsuit and ultimately reached a conclusion on the merits. 
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Then, and only then could a party that prevailed on the merits possibly have a contractual 
right to enforce the attorney's fees provision of Unicity's Policies and Procedures. 
However, the way the case ended up is that the lower court ruled that Mr. Hooban was not 
even a party to the contract, and therefore he could neither enforce the contract or be 
bound by the contract. Judge Davis correctly noted that since Mr. Hooban had not 
executed a contract with Unicity, and because Judge Schofield thus found that Mr. 
Hooban lacked standing, the law of the case precluded any award to either party based on 
the contract. R. at 1583-84, 1843. Unicity now attempts to twist Utah's reciprocal fees 
statute to apply between parties that have never contracted with each other in contrast to 
established precedent. See Anglin v. Contractor Fabrication Machining, 2001 UT App 
341, 37 P.3d 267; West v. Case, 2006 UT App 325, 142 P.3d 576; see also Wagner v. 
Clifton, 2002 UT 109, f 13, 62 P.3d 440. 
Consider the alternative. If Mr. Hooban is not allowed to enforce any contractual 
provision of the H&H/Unicity contract against Unicity, is it just to allow Unicity the 
ability to impose a contractual provision it had with H&H, a third party that is not even in 
this lawsuit, against Mr. Hooban? Clearly, the answer is "no." The result would be 
grossly inequitable. 
Unicity's argument that Mr. Hooban would have been entitled to attorney's fees if 
he had been the prevailing party is not only incorrect, but it is circular. For Mr. Hooban 
to have prevailed in this lawsuit, the trial court would have had to conclude that Mr. 
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Hooban was a party to and could enforce the Distributorship Agreement with Unicity. 
Consistent with Unicity's Policies and Procedures, Mr. Hooban would also then have 
been required to execute a distributorship agreement, which Hooban offered to do and 
was rejected. Mr. Hooban was willing to bind himself to the Unicity Policies and 
Procedures (R. at 1807, 1788) but Unicity would not. Now Unicity wants to bind Mr. 
Hooban by the very terms of those Policies and Procedures. Only then, as a party to the 
Agreement, would Mr. Hooban have been subject to a distributorship agreement with 
Unicity and possibly entitled to seek an award of attorney's fees under the terms of the 
agreement. Again, however, the trial court specifically ruled to the contrary. Therefore, 
the Agreement Unicity may have had with H&H Network Services, Inc. does not confer 
any rights upon Mr. Hooban, nor can he be bound by any of its terms. Unicity argued this 
very line of reasoning before the trial court in stating, "As Hooban is not a party to the 
Distributorship Agreement, he can not sue to enforce the Distributorship Agreement." R. 
at 1140. Ironically, Unicity now wants the ability to enforce the terms of the 
Distributorship Agreement against Mr. Hooban as if he were a party to it. Unicity is 
seeking in this appeal what it so vehemently opposed before the lower court; enforceable 
obligations pursuant to the H&H contract. 
5. The Bilanzich case is inapplicable to a lawsuit between parties that never 
contracted with each other. 
The Utah Supreme Court has said: "One of the most basic principles of contract 
law is that, as a general rule, only parties to the contract may enforce the rights and 
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obligations created by the contract." Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, Tf 13, 62 P.3d 440 
(internal citation omitted). Unicity has ignored this long-standing principle and seeks to 
have this Court ignore precedent and allow Unicity to use a contract it has with H&H 
Network Services (a third party) as grounds for an award of attorney's fees against Mr. 
Hooban, who was not party to or successor in interest to the H&H/Unicity contract. 
Unicity erroneously relies on the Bilanzich case. The first legal point that the 
Bilanzich case makes is found right in the introduction, where the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "[78B-5-826] grants the district court discretion to award attorney fees 
and costs to a prevailing party...." Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, ]f 1, 160 P.3d 1041 (emphasis 
added). Unicity does not even attempt to show any abuse of the discretion exercised by 
the trial court in denying its motion for attorney's fees. Based on this fact alone, the 
Court of Appeals should affirm. 
Bilanzich stands for the premise that where two parties to a contract litigate based 
on the terms of that contract and a provision in the contract is deemed to be unenforceable 
due to the failure of a condition precedent, the prevailing party still has the right to use 
Utah's reciprocal attorney's fees statute to enforce a unilateral attorney's fees clause 
found in that contract against the party whom the unilateral language benefited. Bilanzich 
does not address the factually distinct scenario found in this case where the parties to the 
litigation are not the parties to the contract, and where the issue is not the enforceability 
of a contract, but standing to sue based on the contract. Furthermore, this case deals with 
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a contract that contains an attorney's fees provision that benefits both contracting parties, 
so Utah Code §78B-5-826 does not even come into play. 
In Bilanzich, the Lonettis lent money to REI. Id. at 12. REI defaulted on the loan, 
and Michael Bilanzich signed a personal guaranty for the loan (as modified) in an effort 
to prevent foreclosure. Id. at fflf 2-3. Bilanzich's personal guaranty to the Lonettis 
contained language "that granted the Lonettis any 'costs, expenses, and attorney's fees 
incurred in collection of the Note and realization of the security.'" Id. at f^ 4. REI failed 
and went into bankruptcy. Id. at f^ 5. Bilanzich subsequently filed a lawsuit against the 
Lonettis and their company seeking declaratory judgment that the personal guaranty was 
unenforceable due to the failure of a condition precedent. Id. at ^ 6. Bilanzich moved for 
and was granted partial summary judgment that the personal guaranty was unenforceable 
due to the failure of the condition precedent. Id. at Tf 6. Bilanzich moved for attorney's 
fees based on Utah Code §[78B-5-826] because his legal action was brought to enforce 
the contract to which he was a party, and the contract gave the Lonettis a right to recover 
their attorney's fees, but no reciprocal right for Bilanzich. Id. at ^ 7. The lower court 
denied the motion. Id. at f 8. The Court of Appeals affirmed based on the common law 
rule that "a party may not avoid [a] contract and, at the same time, claim the benefit of the 
provision for attorney fees." Id. (internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed. Id. at ^ 23. 
The narrow issue on appeal in Bilanzich was "Whether Utah Code Ann. §[78B-5-
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826] allows an award of attorney fees pursuant to a contract, where a party successfully 
claims the same contract is unenforceable due to failure of a condition precedent." Id. at 
1f 9. The Supreme Court concluded that "the failure of the condition [precedent] rendered 
the entire document unenforceable. ... [thus] Bilanzich cannot establish a contractual 
claim to attorney's fees...." Id. at fflf 11, n. 4, f^ 12. The Court next considered whether 
Utah's reciprocal fees statute [§78B-5-826] would authorize the trial court to consider 
and award of attorney's fees to Bilanzich where the contract was unenforceable. Id. at f 
12. The Court ultimately concluded that the statute, which was intended by the legislature 
to level the playing field between contracting parties, could authorize such an award so 
long as the lawsuit was based on a writing between the parties and there was an attorney's 
fees provision for one of the parties. Id. at ^ 14-18. However, the Court again pointed 
out that although a trial court may award attorney's fees under the statute, the court "is 
not required to do so." Id. at Tf 17. 
Despite the fact that the trial court properly exercised its discretion not to award 
attorney's fees for several reasons, Unicity wants this Court to require the trial court "to 
do so." Such a position is contrary to the very language found in §78B-5-826, and 
conflicts with Bilanzich. 
Bilanzich addresses the terms of a contract that was entered into by the litigating 
parties, but this matter has no such contract between the parties; therefore Bilanzich is 
inapplicable. 
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Furthermore, in Bilanzich, the personal guaranty was found to be unenforceable, 
but there still existed a contract between the parties that was the subject matter of the 
lawsuit. In this case, there is no contract between the parties, so it makes no sense to 
apply the reciprocal fees statute, which is intended to level the playing field between 
contracting parties (See West and Anglin infra). The field between H&H and Unicity 
was already level since the attorney's fees provision of Unicity's Policies and Procedures 
granted attorney's fees to either prevailing party. But Unicity is cleverly trying to use a 
statute that is intended to balance out unilateral attorney's fees provisions as the basis to 
secure attorney's fees against a party with which it never contracted. Talk about an un-
level playing field; it would be ridiculous to grant attorney's fees based on a contract 
against a party that has not contracted in the first place. 
In Bilanzich, the issue was whether the contract between the parties could be 
enforced by one contracting party against the other. In this case, the issue is not 
enforceability; the issue is whether a non-party had standing to sue to enforce a third-
party contract. The lower court properly determined that since Mr. Hooban was not a 
party to the contract, he had no standing to sue to enforce its provisions. 
The common law doctrine of not being able to enforce an attorney's fees clause 
found in an unenforceable contract has a potential to result in an inequity where a party to 
the contract can possibly get out of its obligation to pay attorney's fees under the contract 
by proving that the contract itself is not enforceable. However, there is no such inequity 
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in the case that is now before this Court. Mr. Hooban, who never was a party to the 
contract at issue, is not even given the possibility to enforce an attorney's fees provision 
against Unicity, because he cannot even sue on the contract. By the same token, Unicity 
should not be able to enforce its contract with a third party on a non-contracting 
individual that never contracted with Unicity. To hold otherwise would make reason 
stare. It would be inconceivable to allow Unicity on one hand enforce its attorney's fees 
provision against an individual with whom it has never contracted, but at the same time 
deny that individual the opportunity to even sue based on that same contract because he 
was not a party to it in the first place. Unicity cannot have it both ways. The result 
rendered by the lower court was just and should not be undone by a misapplication of 
Bilanzich. 
6. The Court should award Mr, Hooban his costs on appeal. 
This Court should award Mr. Hooban his costs incurred to defend this appeal 
pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The Record contains no evidence to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court 
in denying Unicity's claim for attorney's fees based on Utah's reciprocal fees statute, thus 
this Court should affirm based on Unicity's failure to marshall the evidence to show an 
abuse of discretion. Furthermore, Utah Code §78B-5-826 is inapplicable to the facts of 
this case. 
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The Court should also award Roger Hooban his costs incurred on appeal. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
If the Court does not summarily affirm the trial court's ruling, Roger Hooban 
respectfully requests oral argument on this appeal. 
Dated this I [fay of June, 2009. 
TYCKSEN & SHATTUCK, L.C. 
Chad C Shattuck 
Attorney for Roger Hooban 
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The U.S. Policies & Procedures (the "Policies & Procedures") are effective and binding upon Associates of Unicity 
International, Inc. (which, together with its current subsidiaries, successors, and assigns, are collectively referred to 
herein as "Unicity") as of October 1, 2004. Associates' activities on and after October 1, 2004, must be in accord with 
these Policies & Procedures. Unicity may amend the Contract, as defined below, at any time at its discretion, and such 
changes shall be effective and binding thirty (30) days after appearance on the Unicity corporate website or in an official 
Unicity publication or reprints of the Policies & Procedures. 
The Policies & Procedures govern the way a United States Associate conducts business with Unicity, other 
Associates, and Retail Customers. The Unicity Compensation Plan (the "Compensation Plan"), the Associate 
Distributorship Application/Agreement (the "Distributor Agreement"), and these Policies & Procedures constitute 
a complete contract (the "Contract") between, respectively, Associates and Unicity. Any interpretation, clarification, 
exclusion, or exception to this Contract, in order to be effective, must be in writing and signed by an authorized officer 
of Unicity Where the context permits, the singular includes the plural and vice versa and one gender includes any 
gender. An Associate's continuation of a Distributorship or acceptance of earnings pursuant to the Compensation 
Plan or acceptance of any other benefits under the Contract constitutes acceptance of the Contract and any and all 
amendments thereto. This Contract supercedes all Contracts between the Associate and Unicity Network, Inc., Rexall 
Showcase International, Inc., or The Enrich Corporation, as the case may be. 
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SECTION 7 
Associate Compensation and Fees 
trade shows, or exhibits but may not display competing 
products or products from any other direct-selling 
company. 
A. Associate Compensation and Fees 
An Associate is compensated pursuant to the 
Compensation Plan. The Compensation Plan is more fully 
set forth in Appendix A to these Policies & Procedures. 
The following policies outline the guidelines for payment 
of earnings under the Compensation Plan and applicable 
fees charged to Associates. 
B. Rank Attainment 
An Associate is wholly responsible for meeting the 
Associate's monthly 1) Volume requirements, 2) Rank, 
and 3) any other program Qualifications or requirements. 
Unicity has no obligation to guarantee or assure that an 
Associate meets any Qualification requirements of the 
Compensation Plan. 
C Earnings Guarantees 
An Associate is neither guaranteed a specific income nor 
assured any level of profit or success. An Associate's profit 
and success can come only through the successful retail 
sale, use, and consumption of Unicity products and the 
retail sales, use, and consumption of Unicity products by 
other Associates within the Associate's Downline. 
D. Minimum Monthly Compensation Check 
Unless otherwise stipulated by Unicity and to minimize 
processing and handling costs, Unicity will not generate 
a monthly check for any amount under ten dollars 
($10.00). Should an Associate be eligible for a Commission 
payment of less than ten dollars ($10.00), this amount will 
be credited to the Associate's Unicity account. 
E. Processing Fee 
An Associate will have deducted from the Associate's 
monthly Commission check a reasonable processing fee 
for computer processing and other customer services. 
F. Payment of Commission Checks 
Commission checks will be mailed or direct deposited 
monthly on or before the twentieth (20th) day following 
the month in which the Commission was earned. 
However, if the 20th day falls on a weekend or a holiday, 
the Commission checks will be sent out on the first 
business day thereafter. Commission checks issued to 
joint applicants in a Distributorship will be issued in the 
names of the first two applicants listed on the Distributor 
Agreement. Without prejudice to Unicity's right of 
termination, the payment of an Associate's Commission 
may be suspended if the Associate is in breach of any term 
or condition of the contract. 
G. Debiting of Commission Checks 
An Associate agrees that Unicity may debit or place a hold 
on an Associate's Commission check(s) for any amount 
the Associate owes Unicity. 
H. Replacement Checks 
Upon request, Unicity will issue a replacement check 
for a lost or stolen check; however, if the check has been 
cashed, a service fee of ten percent (10%) of the value of 
the check but not more than thirty dollars ($30.00) will be 
assessed. Replacement and stop-payment requests will 
not be honored until ten (10) business days after the check 
was issued. 
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I. Returned or Unclaimed Unicity Checks 
Unicity makes every effort to ensure that Unicity 
Associates receive their Commission checks. However, 
when a Unicity Commission check has been sent to the 
last known address but returned to Unicity because a 
Associate has moved without a forwarding address or 
the check is returned or not presented for payment for 
some other reason beyond Unicity's control, the check 
shall be voided and the amount shall be credited to 
the Distributorship account ninety (90) days after its 
date of issue, which credit may be subject to a monthly 
maintenance fee. 
J. Foreign Market Instability 
The ability to make payments to Ambassadors as a result 
of the sale of Unicity products in countries outside the 
United States is dependent upon the receipt by Unicity of 
U.S. dollars in connection with such sales. Consequently, 
Unicity may restrict, delay, or modify payments to 
Ambassadors during such time as conditions in a foreign 
country limit or restrict the conversion or repatriation of 
money to Unicity. 
K. Service Fees 
Although Unicity provides most Associate services to 
Associates free of charge, from time to time an Associate 
will request or require extraordinary services that warrant 
additional time and expense to research and resolve. 
Unicity charges a fee of fifty dollars ($50.00) per hour, with 
a minimum of one hour assessed for each such case. 
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SECTION 8 
Associate Termination 
A. Voluntary Resignation 
In addition to other rights of termination attendant to the 
nature of a Distributorship, an Associate may, at any time, 
voluntarily resign as a Unicity Associate. An Associate 
who resigns loses all rights to all beneficial interests in 
the Distributorship and to any Downline genealogy, 
Associate privileges, and Associate Rank. An Associate 
who voluntarily resigns may not reapply for a new 
Distributorship or apply to hold a beneficial interest in an 
existing Distributorship until six (6) months after Unicity 
has finalized the termination. An Associate may resign 
voluntarily by: 
1) Submitting to Unicity a resignation letter signed by 
all Associates in the Distributorship and listing the 
Associate name(s) and ID Number(s); or 
I) Failing to renew the Distributor Agreement for an 
additional annual term (see Section 3.D). 
B. Involuntary Termination 
An Associate may be terminated by Unicity for cause. 
An Associate agrees that Unicity has the right to take 
quick and decisive action in limiting or terminating a 
Distributorship that is found in violation of the Policies & 
Procedures, the Distributor Agreement, the Compensation 
^an, or any state or federal laws, statutes, and/or 
•egulations that pertain to the business of Unicity. Unicity 
also reserves'the right to pursue reasonable legal recourse 
:or such violations, as well as reimbursement from the 
Associate for any expenses arising from the violation, 
ncluding court costs and attorney's fees. 
Z. Disciplinary Process 
failure to abide by the Contract may lead to appropriate 
iisdplinary action. After a disciplinary action is complete, 
Unicity may announce details of such disciplinary 
action. Policy violations that do not lead to immediate 
termination may be dealt with in the following manner. 
The disciplinary process may involve any one step or all 
of these steps: 
1) Informal warning. The Associate may be notified, 
verbally or in writing, that the Associate is in 
violation of the Contract. 
2) Formal warning. A formal written warning may be 
sent to the offending Associate stating that failure to 
discontinue the stated violation may result in further 
disciplinary action. 
3) Probation. An Associate may be placed on probation 
for violating the Contract. The length and conditions 
of the probation may vary, depending upon the 
circumstances. An Associate placed on probation 
may appeal the probation using the procedures for 
appealing suspensions as described below. 
4) Suspension. Suspension is the temporary withdrawal 
of a Distributorship's licenses. An Associate and 
Distributorship may be suspended for serious 
violations or breaches of the Contract, and a 
suspension may last for a period of days or months, 
depending on each case. In the event of a suspension, 
a suspension letter will be sent to the Associate and 
considered a final warning. This notice will list actions 
that the Associate must take in order for Unicity to 
revoke the suspension. These actions may include the 
following: 
a) The immediate cessation of all violations; 
b) The submission of a written statement to Unicity 
responding to the suspension; and 
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c) Such other action as may be necessary or 
requested by Unicity. 
An Associate who fails to respond to a suspension 
letter may be terminated. An Associate may 
appeal a suspension in writing within the 
specified time period outlined in the suspension 
letter. Suspended Associates are not eligible to 
receive compensation, earned or otherwise, from 
Unicity or participate in any Unicity functions or 
programs. Unicity reserves the right to withhold 
compensation until the disciplinary process has 
been completed to Unicity's satisfaction. Because 
suspended Associates may not place product 
orders, they may not Qualify for compensation 
during their term of Suspension. Unicity may, at 
its absolute discretion, Qualify a Distributorship 
during the suspension and retain all earned 
Commissions. 
5) Termination. 
D. Notification of Termination for Cause 
When a decision is made to terminate an Associate 
for cause, Unicity will send notification by mail to the 
terminated Associate at the most recent address on file. 
Upon receipt of notice from Unicity, the Associate shall 
immediately cease all Associate activities. Notice will be 
deemed received upon delivery, but no later than ten (10) 
days after mailing. 
E. Appeal of Termination 
An Associate who has been terminated involuntarily 
may appeal die termination by submitting in writing an 
explanation, including any extenuating or mitigating 
circumstances. The Associate must submit the written 
appeal within the time period specified in the termination 
letter, but at least within fifteen (15) days of receipt of 
notice of the termination. Unicity will review the timely 
appeal and notify the Associate of its decision. If the 
appeal is not received within the specified time period, the 
termination will be final. 
R Results of Termination 
Whether a Distributorship is terminated through 
voluntary resignation or through involuntary termination 
?y Unicity, that Distributorship's licenses, rights, 
and privileges are revoked and the Associate is no 
onger entitled to sell Unicity products, Sponsor other 
prospective Unicity Associates, or represent himself or 
lerself as an independent contractor or Associate of 
"Jnicity. In addition, a terminated Associate loses all rights 
:o the existing Downline and is no longer entitled to 
•eceive Commissions, overrides, rebates, awards, or any 
compensation whatsoever, already earned or otherwise, 
from Unicity, nor is the Associate entitled to any other 
claim for indemnification with regard to the loss of Ms 
or her Retail Customer base or any investments made. 
An Associate also loses any rights to Associate Lists. A 
terminated Associate must immediately return all existing 
Associate Lists to Unicity and all other documents and 
materials made available to him or her. Involuntarily 
Terminated Distributorships are the property of Unicity 
and may remain in the current Unicity genealogical 
Distributorship position and will be disposed of in 
a manner that reflects consideration and serves the 
best interests of Unicity, as well as the interests of the 
Downline Distributors of the terminated Distributorship 
and the Upline of the terminated Distributorship. An 
Associate who has been terminated for cause may not 
reapply for a Unicity Distributorship for eighteen (18) 
months following the termination. If an Associate is at the 
rank of Presidential Director or higher and is terminated 
for cause, then he or she agrees that he or she will not 
compete in any market that Unicity has officially opened 
for a period of six (6) months following the termination 
of his or her Distributorship. The provision proscribing 
Cross-Sponsoring shall survive the termination of the 
Contract. 
G. Product Buy-Back 
An Associate who voluntarily terminates his or her 
Distributorship may return with his or her resignation 
letter all "Currently Marketable," unencumbered, 
reusable, unopened, and otherwise resalable inventory 
in the Associate's possession. Unicity will refund ninety 
percent (90%) of the net cost to the Associate, less any 
consideration received (i.e., Commissions or promotions, 
etc., paid to the Associate) by the Associate for purchase 
of the goods. Unicity will also repurchase any initial 
mandatory sales materials that are returned, shipping 
prepaid, in reusable and resalable condition for one 
hundred percent (100%) of the cost to the Associate. 
Unicity will not issue any refunds on products previously 
certified as sold under the 70% Rule. Distributorships 
that are terminated for cause are not eligible for the 90% 
product buy-back or the 100% sales material buy-back. 
1) For purposes of this policy, products shall not be 
considered "Currently Marketable" if returned after 
the products' commercially reasonable, usable, or 
shelf-life period has passed; nor shall products be 
considered "Currently Marketable" if Unicity clearly 
discloses to Associates, prior to purchase, that the 
products are seasonal, discontinued, or special 
promotional products. 
2) If Commissions were paid to a terminating 
Associate's Upline on Volume represented by 
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H. Governing Law and Jurisdiction 
This Contract shall be governed by the law of the State of 
Utah, as that law applies to contracts made and performed 
wholly within the State of Utah. Unicity and the Associate 
irrevocably consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the State of Utah and of any federal courts in the State of 
Utah in connection with any suit, action or proceeding 
arising out of, or relating to the Contract. Venue shall be 
exclusively in the State and federal courts situated in Utah 
and Salt Lake Counties, Utah. In the event of a dispute, 
the prevailing party shall be reimbursed attorney's fees 
and reasonable travel and accommodation costs by the 
other party. 
returned products, the Commissions paid on such 
Volume will be debited from the Upline beneficiaries' 
accounts. Although certain requirements may vary by 
law in some jurisdictions, Associates seeking a refund 
must do the following: 
a) Call the Unicity Client Care Department and 
request a Return Merchandise Authorization 
(R.M.A.) form and/or number. 
b) Request in writing a refund from Unicity (this 
document must be accompanied by copies of the 
original product invoices and the R.M.A. form 
and/or number). 
c) Return the package with the R.M.A. number 
clearly marked on the outside of the package, 
near the return address. 
I. Limitation of Liability 
Regardless of the form of claim, whether in tort, contract, 
or other, Unicity and its officers, employees, and agents 
shall not be liable for any consequential, incidental, 
special, or punitive damages, including lost profits, for 
any claims by another Associate. No legal action may be 
brought by either party to this Contract more than one 
year after the event giving rise to the cause of action has 
occurred. 
Shipping costs to return the products must 
be paid by the Associate. The Associate is 
responsible for any damage or loss in the 
shipping process. Goods damaged en route, and 
therefore not marketable, will be rejected. After 
full verification of all submitted paperwork and 
returned items, Unicity will issue the terminating 
Associate a refund based on the method of 
payment. 
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DEC 1 8 2006 
UTAH CO(ji\rTy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER HOOBAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNICITY INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 050401109 
DATED: DECEMBER 18, 2006 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court for ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. Having 
heard oral argument and having considered the memoranda and affidavits filed with respect to 
these motions, I now issue this ruling granting Unicity's motion for summary judgment and 
denying Hooban's motion for summary judgment. 
This is an action brought by Roger Hooban against Unicity, a multi-level marketing 
company. Hooban asserts he acquired an ownership interest in a Unicity distributorship and that 
Unicity refuses to recognize or accept him as a distributor. Unicity counterclaimed asserting that 
Hooban did not properly acquire and is not the holder of the distributorship and thus is not 
obligated to recognize him as a distributor. 
Each of the parties filed a motion for summary judgment. Unicity filed first and asserts 
1 C:->E; 
that the distributorship at issue was owned by H&H Network Services, Inc. ("H&H"), a 
corporation; that the owners of the stock of H&H, John and Brenda Hargetts, filed bankruptcy 
and that the trustee of their bankruptcy proceeding sold their stock as a part of administering their 
bankruptcy estate; that Hooban purchased the stock of H&H; that the distributorship at issue is 
subject to a provision of the distributorship agreement that grants to Unicity a right to first offer 
when any distributorship is to be sold; and that when it learned that the stock of H&H had been 
sold, Unicity promptly offered to purchase the distributorship from H&H and Hooban. 
There is no genuine dispute as to any of the foregoing facts asserted by Unicity. 
Hooban brought this lawsuit claiming that he owns the distributorship. Unicity claims 
that he does not own the distributorship, but rather that he owns the stock of H&H. As such, 
Unicity claims, he does not have standing to assert the claims which he makes against Unicity. 
Unicity is correct. The legal analysis supplied by Unicity amply demonstrates that Hooban does 
not own the distributorship. Rather he owns stock. The record is clear and undisputed that the 
order signed by the bankruptcy judge which authorized and approved the sale provides that the 
sale is of "100 % of the stock of H&H Network Services, Inc." The stock was sold for $32,000 
to Hooban. He thus purchased stock, not a distributorship agreement. H&H, which now is 
owned by Hooban, owns the distributorship. Yet, H&H is not a party to this lawsuit. Rather, 
Hooban, individually, asserted he owns the distributorship and brought this action against 
Unicity. However, since Hooban only owns stock but not the distributorship, he does not have 
standing to bring his claims against Unicity asserting that Unicity has breached some duty to him 
under the distributorship agreement. There is no dispute to the facts which support this analysis. 
Because Hooban is not a party to the contract, he lacks standing to assert any claims against 
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Unicity arising out of the contract. Since all of the claims of his complaint arise out of the 
contract, his action against Unicity must be dismissed. 
Secondly, the distributorship agreement provides many safeguards for Unicity so that it 
cannot be compelled to contract with someone with whom it does not wish to do business. These 
safeguards include the right to first offer, which Unicity exercised but which Hooban refuses to 
recognize. That right provides Unicity the opportunity, whenever a distributor, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily, transfers its rights under the distributorship agreement, to a first offer 
to purchase the distributorship back. In this case the transfer of the stock of H&H by the 
bankruptcy trustee was such a transfer as H&H now was owned by Hooban rather than the 
Hargetts. Unicity had the right to a first offer if it did not wish to engage in business with 
Hooban, who now owned H&H. Unicity properly and timely attempted to exercise that right but 
Hooban refused. Unicity is entitled to purchase the distributorship from Hooban on the terms 
under which he acquired any rights in the distributorship. 
There is no genuine issue as to the foregoing facts and the parties do not significantly 
dispute the facts upon which the foregoing analysis rests. Rather, they disagree as to application 
of the law. Yet, on the foregoing two theories, Unicity's analysis of the law is correct. Hooban 
does not have standing to assert ownership of the distributorship at issue in this case as all he 
acquired was the stock of H&H, not the separate rights in the distributorship, and Hooban was in 
error when he refused to accede to Unicity's offer to purchase the distributorship. 
I grant Unicity's motion for summary judgment and deny Hooban's cross motion for 
summary j udgment. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Unicity's counsel is directed to 
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prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this ]b_ day of December, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: , , ^ ^ f ^ M ^ > 
ANTHONYW 
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Unicity International, Inc., 
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JUDGE: LYNN W DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on June 4, 2007 for oral arguments on Defendant's 
Motion to Tax Costs and Attorney's Fees. Plaintiff was present by and through counsel, B. Ray 
Zoll. Defendant was present by and through Mssrs, John S. Clifford and Steven C. Smith. 
Argument was entertained and the matter was taken under advisement. The Court, having 
considered the legal arguments and memoranda on file, now issues the following: 
I 
Background and Procedural History 
1. The distributorship at issue was owned by H & H Network Services, a corporation. 
The owners of the stock of H & H, filed bankruptcy and the trustee of their bankruptcy sold their 
stock as part of the bankruptcy administration. Hooban purchased the stock of H & H. The 
distributorship at issue is subject to a provision of the distributorship agreement that grants 
Unicity a right to first offer when any distributorship is sold. Unicity promptly offered to 
purchase the distributorship from H & H and Hooban. 
2. Unicity refused to accept Roger Hooban as a distributor in the distributorship. Unicity 
asserted that Roger Hooban did not properly acquire and is not the holder of the distributorship. 
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3. On April 6, 2005, Mr. Roger Hooban initiated this action against Defendant, Unicity, 
for breach of a distributorship between Unicity and H & H. Unicity is a multi-level marketing 
company. 
4. On January 29, 2007, Judge Anthony W. Schofield entered an order granting summary 
judgment for Unicity ("Order"). The Order dismissed Mr. Hooban's claims, finding that Mr. 
Hooban, though the owner of H & H, was not a party to the Distributorship Agreement and 
therefore, lacked standing to bring the law suit. 
5. Mr. Hooban never signed the Agreement or a separate distributorship agreement with 
Unicity. 
6. On February 7, 2007, Unicity filed a motion to recover the attorneys' fees it incurred 
in this matter. 
II 
Legal Analysis 
Unicity has made a claim for costs and for attorney's fees. The Court will first address 
the issue of costs. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "costs shall be allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civil Proc, Rule 54 
(d)(1). However, as noted by plaintiff, the rules also provide that to seek costs a party must serve 
upon the adverse party within five days after the entry of judgment "a copy of a memorandum of 
the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly stating the items are correct." Id. At Rule 54 (d)(2). The rule is clear 
that such a motion must be served within 5 days of judgment. There is discretionary provision 
that would permit an award of costs where the moving party has failed to comply with Rule 54. 
Mr. Hooban claims that Unicity missed the mandatory five day deadline imposed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is not permitted to seek costs from Mr. Hooban. This court 
rejects plaintiffs argument. 
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Having rejected the timeliness argument, the court must look at the merits. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that costs, as that term is used in Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, "means those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to 
witnesses, and which the statutes authorize to be included in the judgment." Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). The Court in Frampton held that 
there is a distinction between necessary litigation expenses and taxable costs. Id. Unicity is 
correct in asserting that the cost of depositions, if verified, is an awardable cost. See Ong Int'l 
(U.S.A.) V 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 461 (Utah 1993). Unicity is entitled to deposition 
costs in the sum of $ 1,349.20. 
As noted by plaintiff, a substantial portion of Unicity's alleged costs are not those that fit 
the definition provided by the Utah Supreme Court. Plaintiff has petitioned the court to award 
$364.80 for costs of copying case documents, $465.72 for attorney time, filing fees (though, as 
the defendant in this action, the court should question what filing fees Unicity actually incurred) 
and legal support services in California; and $425.93 in Federal Express and facsimile charges. 
None of these expenses were required to be paid to the court or any witnesses. These costs, 
which amount to $1256.45, are per se un-taxable. 
Next the Court will examine Unicity's bases for an award of attorney's fees. As set forth 
in the Motion, Unicity claims entitlement to its attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code 78-26-
56(1). Unicity argues that Hooban, despite being well aware of the glaring problems with his 
case, kept pursuing his claims. Hooban's claims were frivolous and completely devoid of merit, 
and Unicity is entitled to its attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code 78-26-56(1). 
Utah Code Ann. Provides that in "civil actions the court shall award reasonable attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action of defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faithf.]" Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that a claim is without merit if it is "frivolous" or " of little weight or 
importance, having no basis in law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P .2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
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"[T]he mere fact that an action is meritless does not necessarily mean that the action is also 
brought in bad faith." Still Standing Stable. L.L.C. v. Allen. 2005 UT 46, 9, 122 P .3d 556. 
Unicity argues that Hooban's action was without merit because (1) "Hooban knew that he 
was not a party to the distributorship agreement"; (2) "Hooban knew that he had only purchase 
[sic] the stock of H & H, and knew that he did not have standing to bring a lawsuit based on a 
contract to which he was not a party"; and (3) "Hooban also knew that H & H had breached the 
agreement by refusing to accept Unicity's offer to purchase the distributorship." See Unicity's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Attorneys' Fees, pp. 4-5. 
Unicity also accuses Mr. Hooban's counsel of attempting to "force Unicity to settle" by refusing 
to dismiss the case to show that Mr. Hooban's counsel was aware the claims were without merit. 
Id. at p. 5. 
Neither the December 18, 2006 ruling of Judge Anthony W. Schofield, nor the January 
29, 2007 Order on Unicity's Motion for Summary Judgment and Hooban's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment contain any language, findings or conclusions supporting a claim that the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. Though briefed, and 
presumably argued, there is no mention of a meritless claim in the ruling or order. The Order of 
Judge Schofield is controlling and must be honored. Admittedly, the Order, but not the ruling, 
does state in paragraph 3 as follows: "Any motions for costs and/or attorney's fees shall be made 
pursuant to Rule 54 (costs), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 73 (attorney's fees), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure." 
Based upon the "Ruling" and the "Order" of Judge Schofield, the court simply finds no 
legal basis for an award of attorney's fees based upon "frivolous, meritless, lack of good faith" 
claim or theory. Judge Schofield simply did not adjudicate this issue. 
Next, the court will address Unicity's claim for attorney's fees under Utah Code 78-27-
56.5. Defendant's arguments are concise, and presented as follows in its Reply Memorandum: 
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Quite obviously, a party who has not been sued under a contract and is not suing 
under a contract is not entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to the contract. 
However, where a party has alleged claims under a contract containing an 
attorneys' fees provision, that party is liable for attorneys' fees should it not 
prevail. Utah Code 78-27-56.5; Carr v. Enoch Smith Company (1989) 781 P.2d 
1292. This is also the law in other jurisdictions. (California: See California 
Civil Code 1717 (stating "In any action on a contract, where the contract 
specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce 
that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing 
party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, 
whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs."); Rainer National Bank v. 
Bodilv (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 83, 85-85, 282 Cal.Rptr. 926 (stating "Under Civil 
Code section 1717, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees even when it 
wins on the grounds that the contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or 
non-existent, so long as the party pursuing the lawsuit would have been entitled to 
attorney's fees had it prevailed. (Citations omitted.) The rational is that Civil 
Code section 1717 is guided by equitable principles, including mutuality of 
remedy, and it would be inequitable to deny attorney's fees to one who 
successfully defends, simply because the initiating party filed a meritless case." 
(Citations omitted.); Jones v. Drain (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 484, 196 Cal.Rptr. 
827; Nevada: See Mackintosh v. California Federal Savings & Logan Association 
(1977) 113 Nev. 393, 405-406, 935 P.2d 1154 (noting that Florida follows the 
same rule.); Arizona: See A.R.S. 12-341.01; Marcus v. Fox (1986) 150 Ariz. 333, 
723 P.2d 682, 684-685 (stating "By allowing attorney's fees only where there is a 
breach of a valid contract and not where the dispute concerns the validity of the 
contract, the result would be both inequitable and unjust"). 
Awarding attorneys' fees against the party asserting the contract claims 
case makes logical sense, in that a party who asserts claims based on a contract 
should not be permitted to shift gears after being unsuccessful and claim that it 
should not be required to pay attorneys' fees pursuant to the very contract that it 
sought to enforce. To allow a party to try to enforce a contract and then escape 
the attorneys' fees provision contained in that very contract would not be 
equitable. 
Again, the plain language of Utah Code 78-27-56.5 establishes a right to 
attorneys' fees in a case such as this one. The statue provides: 
"A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
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promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed 
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one 
party to recover attorney's fees." (Emphasis added.) 
Whereas it makes sense that the "either party" language in the statute 
should not extend to any party to the lawsuit (as in Anglin and West), the "either 
party" language necessarily recognizes that at least one party in an action based on 
a contract containing an attorneys' fees provision is entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees. If an action involves a contract containing an attorneys' fees 
provision, one party must prevail, and that party is entitled to attorneys' fees from 
the other party. 
Plaintiff counters these persuasive arguments by noting the Court, in its ruling on 
summary judgment found that "[bjecause Hooban is not a party to the contract, he lacks standing 
to assert any claims against Unicity arising out of the contract. Ruling, December 18, 2006, p.2; 
See also. Minute Entry, January 29, 2007. If Mr. Hooban was not a party to the Agreement, the 
terms of the agreement, including the prevailing party provision, do not apply to him. See 
Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, 100 P.3d 1200 (It is one of the most basic 
principles of contract law that only the parties to the contract can be bound by the contract). 
Plaintiff argues further that Utah Courts have refused to award attorneys' fees where one 
party to the action is not a party to the contract in question even if the action is based on a written 
agreement with prevailing party language. See Anglin v. Contractor Fabrication Machining, 
2001 UT App 341, 37 P.3d 267; West v. Case, 2006 UT App 325, 142 P.3d 576. In fact, in 
Anglin, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56.5 
only applies to the parties to the contract in question "and not any party to the litigation." 
2006 UT App 341 at 10 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that any 
party to the litigation may recover fees so long as one party to the contract has the right to do so 
under contract. Id. At 11. 
The Court of Appeals explained that the intent of the statute is to allow the party in the 
contract in a weaker position to have reciprocal rights to seek attorney's fees to ucreat[e] a level 
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playing field between all parties". Id. Certainly, the statute's intent only permits the recovery of 
attorneys' fees by one party to a contract against another party to the contract. If is not applicable 
simply because a contract is the underlying basis for the claim. 
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that there is simply no contract between the parties and Mr. 
Hooban never signed any document containing an attorneys' fees provision. By finding that Mr. 
Hooban is not a party to the Agreement, the court in this matter precluded Mr. Hooban from 
having any contractual obligation to Unicity under the Agreement. Like West, this court 
explicitly found that Mr. Hooban's ownership in the stock of H & H did not give him an interest 
in the Agreement. Therefore, Mr. Hooban is not bound by its terms, including the provision for 
attorneys' fees, especially when Mr. Hooban never signed any such agreement and Unicity has 
failed to produce any such signed document. It is clear under the Utah Court of Appeals' 
interpretation of 78-27-56.5 and its holding in West, that Unicity cannot recover attorneys' fees 
pursuant to the statue based on the prevailing party language of the Agreement, regardless of the 
scope or typicality of that language. 
Unicity's argument is persuasive but it relies heavily upon Arizona, Nevada and 
California law. Its reliance of Utah Law, particularly "the plain language" of Utah Code 78-27-
56.5, is misplaced. The court opines that the intent of the statute is to allow the party in the 
contract in a weaker position to have reciprocal rights to seek attorney's fees creates a level 
playing field between all parties. 
In addition, Defendant overlooks the fact that the award of attorney's fees, in 78-27-56.5, 
is permissive. The court can take into account the very unique circumstances and facts of each 
case. The critical language of 78-27-56.5 has also been overlooked by defendant. In order for 
the provision to apply, inter alia, the promissory note, written contract, or other writing must 
have been executed after April 28, 1986 (emphasis added). Black's Law Dictionary p.567 
defines "executed" as follows: 
Executed. Completed; carried into full effect; already done or performed; signed; 
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taking effect immediately; now in existence or in possession; conveying an 
immediate right or possession. Act or course of conduct carried to completion. 
Term imports idea that nothing remains to be done. The opposite of executory. 
See also Execution. 
If the agreement has been completed and signed by these parties and Mr. Hooban has 
immediate rights, then he would have standing under the agreement. But he has never executed 
the agreement and cannot be bound by its terms. Judge Schofield found that he lacked standing. 
That is the law of the case and the parties are bound by that ruling. 
I l l 
Decision 
Defendant's motion for attorney's fees under a "frivolous, lack of good faith, meritless 
claim" theory is not supported by the ruling or order of Judge Schofield. Defendant's motion for 
attorney's fees under 78-27-56.5 is rejected by the court. Defendant's request for costs is granted 
in part. The court will execute the proposed judgment presented by defendant, consistent with 
this ruling. 
Dated this / P ^ a y of July 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
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